Youths and Mediterranean Youth : from Aesthetics to Demography by Domingo i Valls, Andreu, & Bayona, Jordi
Youth as an Aesthetic and 
Demographic Ideal
The arrangement of  age groups, together with 
the arrangement of  sexes, makes up this great 
form of  classification that, starting from the 
biological, articulates every society. In this way, 
gender roles and the social construction of  age 
groups become one of  the basic characteristics 
of  all social organisations. What seems clear to 
us for anthropological or ethnographical study, 
owing to the recognition of  cultural distance, 
is also so for sociological study. Much more for 
demography, whose basic material is its analysis 
of  the sex and age of  the people who make up a 
specific population, together with the changes 
in the demographic behaviour of  generations, 
associated with the socio-demographic events 
that correspond to them.
A dual paradox in the consideration of  
youths and youth characterises our contempo-
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Contemporary society extols the image of  youth, based on aesthetic criteria, while at the same time 
it makes the situation of  youths as individuals precarious. This paradox is especially paradigmatic 
in the Mediterranean basin, where the gap between the two shores is relevant to demographic 
studies and the theories of  the clash of  civilizations. The analysis of  factors such as migrations 
or fertility rates highlights the lack of  young people that the Mediterranean area will experi-
ence in the coming decades, a phenomenon whose extent will finally depend on the political and 
socioeconomic framework of  each country. 
rary society, which is extended by the process 
known as globalisation. The first has to do 
with the individual and the social image of  
age: the reserve with which youths are observed 
in contrast to the surrender to the image of  
youth. An image nurtured by an aesthetic ideal 
centred on the cult of  the body and nourished 
by the interpretation of  Greek-Roman classi-
cism made since the 19th century. Meanwhile, 
moreover, we find the transposition of  these 
supposed values assigned to age as a biological 
attribute of  the individual in the population, 
which relate youth to what is emergent and 
age to what is decadent. Thus, the so-called 
aged societies, as is the case of  the developed 
countries, are characterised by negative values, 
such as loss of  drive or creativity, irremediably 
related to a dark prospect based on doubts about 
the sustainability of  the pensions system. This 
is the disappointing vision of  “societies of  the 
elderly, living in old houses, ruminating on old 
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ideas” predicted by the demographer Alfred 
Sauvy. In contrast, the societies with young or 
relatively young structures are almost always 
considered with optimism, as potential human 
resources despite the evident difficulties that 
these societies and the young individuals that 
form them can experience. The paradox soon 
emerges in seeing how the economic and social 
conditions of  the countries characterised by one 
structure or another manifest a balance com-
pletely inverse to this biologicist tendency to 
resolve matters quickly which is so commonly 
accepted.
Aged societies are characterised 
by negative values, such as loss of  drive 
or creativity, irremediably related to a dark 
prospect
The Mediterranean region has become, very 
much in spite of  the 479 million inhabitants 
of  the different countries that comprised it in 
2005, an example of  this dual paradox. Coun-
tries in the Mediterranean region are faced 
with different population structures: 119 mil-
lion youths would find themselves subjected to 
the cruel reality of  seeing youth exalted while 
at the same time their situation, as individu-
als, becomes more precarious or, even worse, is 
under suspicion. In this respect, the Mediter-
ranean has become a paradigm of  a supposed 
demographic gap, used to defend the so-called 
“clash of  populations”. Samuel P. Huntington 
always uses the comparison between the dif-
ferential demographic growth of  Spain and 
the Maghreb, of  Palestine and Israel, or of  
Serbia and the Albanese of  Kosovo, to explain 
past, present or future conflicts in the region. 
It should be noted that this same writer makes 
the age group of  youths the main potential 
threat of  these conflicts, accusing them of  be-
ing especially inclined to protests, instability, 
reforms (sic!) and revolutions.1 Although not 
with such an extreme vision, a generalised 
trend is observed towards focusing the sub-
ject of  Mediterranean structuring on the 
demographic background and, within this, 
both youths and youth appear in first but not 
a very good place. We intend to analyse these 
prejudices from the demographic viewpoint 
but also with an open blue view, as Ernst 
Bloch would say, in our case, a Mediterra-
nean blue.2
Demographic Determinants 
of Youths 
As we have said, the period called youth is a 
social construction that, as such, in each specific 
society can respond to realities completely dif-
ferent from the historical and anthropological 
point of  view. After the Second World War, in 
the developed countries a whole youth move-
ment emerged which, together with Roman-
ticism, could be one of  the historical periods 
from which the image of  youths in the 21st 
century most derives. Different realities came 
together in this new image of  youth,3 most 
notable among which is the role played by 
the construction of  the welfare state and 
the universalisation of  secondary schooling 
which would mark the 1970s. In the second 
place, there has been mention of  the crisis 
of  parental authority, which during the same 
period was strengthened by the rural exodus 
1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, Touchstone Books, 
1996.
2. Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope, vol. I, Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press, 1986.
3. Carles Feixa, De jóvenes, bandas y tribus, Barcelona, Ariel, 1998.
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and the reindustrialisation of  many Euro-
pean countries, and which in some of  them 
adopted the form of international migration, 
widening the generation gap. In the third 
place, in parallel, the discovery of  the young 
as a bed of  mass consumption is noted, which 
fostered a growing presence of  youthfulness 
in the media. Lastly, the so-called sexual 
revolution and the criticism of  puritan 
morality is noted and would reach its peak 
in the aftermath of  May 68 and the hippy 
movement. All these changes were marked 
out with legal redefinitions, such as the de-
termination of  adulthood, which in its time 
was lowered to eighteen in most countries, 
or socio-demographic redefinitions, such as 
the inversion of  intergenerational flows of  
adults towards minors, the contraception 
revolution4 or the evolution itself  of  the 
population structure, with many of  them 
coinciding with the baby boomer generation 
reaching youth.5 It is very tempting to re-
late the changes experienced by youth with 
the extraordinary growth of  the number of  
young adults.
A second moment, the most recent, has its 
origin in the economic crisis of  the 1970s, and 
although at first it deepened the most negative 
aspects of  youth, that is, the fear of  disorder and 
marginalisation embodied by the youths who 
had been unable to enter the labour market or 
were expelled from it, an almost opposite path 
soon followed, the product of  the effort in the 
investment in human capital, that is, in educa-
tion.6 The added year in education with the 
aim of  improving expectations of  entry into 
the labour market, brought with it a de facto 
increase in youth dependency, measured in 
resources but also in temporal terms in the 
delay in becoming independent economi-
cally and with reference to family and home. 
Especially in countries where the welfare 
state is weak, above all in relation to those 
of  Northern Europe, as is the case of  most 
Mediterranean countries, this investment 
was sustained by the family environment, 
which thus paid the price of  lengthening the 
period of  dependency. Therefore, the expan-
sion of  university studies to broader layers of  
society and the lengthening of  dependency 
have in the end moved the frontiers of  what 
we call youth, extending them, on this occa-
sion, at the top.
The discovery of  the young as a bed of  
mass consumption fostered a growing 
presence of  youthfulness in the media
Once again, this evolution, which we have 
explained very broadly, has its correlation 
in socio-demographic changes. Together 
with the process of  female emancipation, 
the mutations experienced in the social 
definition of  ages are one of  the causes of  
what some demographers have classified 
as the Second Demographic Transition,7 
which explains the transformations that 
have taken place since the end of  the 1960s 
mainly in matters of  fertility, marriage rates, 
and in family structure. These changes oc-
curred with diverse chronologies, marked 
both by the impact of  the economic crisis 
4. Edward Shorter, The Making of the Modern Family, London, Fontana Books, 1975.
5. Richard A. Easterlin, Birth and Fortune: The Impact of Numbers on Personal Welfare, London, Grant McIntyre, 
1980.
6. Enrique Gil Calvo, Los depredadores audiovisuales. Juventud urbana y cultura de masas, Madrid, Tecnos, 1985.
7. Dirk J. van de Kaa, “Europe’s Second Demographic Transition”, Population Bulletin, vol. 42, no. 1, March 1987; Dirk 
J. van de Kaa, “The Second Demographic Transition Revisited: Theories and Expectations”, Symposium on the Population 
Change and European Society, European University of Florence, Florence, 7-10 December 1988; Ron Lesthaeghe, The 
Second Demographic Transition in Western Countries: An Interpretation, Brussels, Princeton University Library, 1991.
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new generations, explain their speed and 
intensity. The extension in the Mediterra-
nean countries of  the Southern shore can 
continue on this same path that, in contrast 
to the opinion of  the defenders of  the Second 
Demographic Transition, has no reason to 
obligatorily converge in its indicators and 
forms, and cannot be read as an indicator of  
modernity or progress. A final demographic 
phenomenon must be borne in mind for this 
redefinition of  youth. Here, we refer specifi-
cally to the rise in life expectancy and the 
improvements in the old age group: that the 
addition of  years of  life, in conditions of  
health that cannot be compared with the 
conditions experienced by previous genera-
tions, has acted both on the redefinition of  
old age and on that of  youth. It could be ar-
gued that, from a collective perspective, the 
years of  life gained at one extreme have also 
allowed the lengthening of  the period that 
we agree on calling “youth”. In the 21st cen-
tury, in most developed countries, the entry 
of  the baby boost generations into youth is 
marking and will mark the conception of  the 
young, who will become a scarce resource. As 
happened in the previous period, the volume 
itself  of  youths, in this case their decrease 
and relative scarcity with respect to adults, 
will have a determinant effect on the percep-
tion of  the young and youth.
Between Ageing and 
the Demographic Bonus
Let us leave aside the young for a moment and 
consider the structures by age of  Mediterrane-
an populations. As we have already suggested, 
while some are defined by the ageing process, 
others continue to show population profiles 
characterised by their youth. At the two poles 
we find Italy, with 19.7% of  people over 65 
while in Palestine, Syria or Jordan they repre-
Darío Villalba, Dancing
(Marlborough Gallery Barcelona).
and by the institutional framework and the 
demographic tradition of  each region. The 
pioneers were the Scandinavian countries, 
followed by the central Europeans, joined 
in the mid-1970s by those of  the Southern 
European Union, such as Spain, Italy, Greece 
and Portugal. The material conditions, but 
also the normative gap between old and 
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sent only 3%. What we call demographic ageing 
is no more than the growth of  the proportion of  
people over 64, a product of  the continued de-
crease in fertility, the so-called ageing from the 
bottom (referring to the population pyramid), 
and of  the increase in life expectancy, what is 
known as ageing from the top. In most Europe-
an Mediterranean countries both the decrease 
in fertility (and the consequent reduction of  the 
youngest generations) and the improvement in 
life expectancy (and, therefore, the growth in 
the elderly population) have been singularly 
intensive and concentrated, producing as a re-
sult a very acute rate of  ageing. A good example 
is Spain, which went from 2.92 children per 
woman during the period 1965-1970 to 1.18 
in the period 1995-2000. Italy lagged behind: 
from the 2.49 in the second half  of  the 1960s 
to 1.21 in the last five years of  the 20th century. 
Increased life expectancy has also been detected 
in these two countries: during the same period 
both went from 71 years of  life expectancy at 
the end of  the 1960s to 80 years at the end of  
the 20th century. The proportion of  elderly has 
increased from almost 10% in 1970 to 16.8% in 
the case of  Spain and 19.7% for Italy in 2005. 
With respect to the young, however, until the 
1990s the baby boom generations still predomi-
nantly comprised these age groups and it will 
not be until the 21st century when the groups 
of  baby boost generations begin to enter, the 
less numerous being those of  the baby burst. 
To give an idea of  the volume it is worth men-
tioning that, following on with the extreme 
cases of  Spain and Italy, the number of  youths 
between 15 and 29 would pass in the first case 
from 9.7 million in 1995, when it reached its 
maximum, to 6.7 million predicted for 2020; 
in the case of  Italy, from a maximum of  13.5 
million in 1990 it would pass to 8.8 in 2015. 
The voices of  alarm, as always, feel justified by 
the predictions made about the future of  this 
population structure. It is in this next decade 
when the effect of  the diminution of  fertility 
will be fully felt in the reduction of  the number 
and proportion of  the young.
In this next decade the effect of  the 
diminution of  fertility will be fully felt 
in the reduction of  the number and 
proportion of  the young
On the Southern shore of  the Mediterra-
nean the situation in terms of  the population 
structure is very different and also contrasted, 
but more in the percentage of  minors (future 
young people) or the elderly than in the per-
centage of  these young people today. Thus, in 
Tunisia the under-15s make up 26% of  the 
population and in Palestine they reach 45.6%, 
while the over-64s obtain minimum values 
of  3% in Palestine, Syria or Jordan, and a 
maximum of  7.2% for Lebanon. Although 
the oscillation of  the youth group is lower in 
the countries of  the Northern shore, between 
32.5% in Syria and 26.5% in Palestine, it is 
in any case above the 16.6% in Italy or 20.5% 
in Spain. The also rapid decrease in fertility,8 
although still far from the minimum val-
ues of  the Northern Mediterranean, as well 
as the more moderate rate of  ageing, has 
meant that some authors, when referring to 
the structure by age of  the population, talk 
of  the “opportunity bonus” or the “demo-
graphic dividend”.9 With these terms they 
make an indirect reference to the beneficial 
8. Morocco has gone from 7.1 children per woman in 1965-1970 to 2.4 in the first five years of the 21st century. In 
Tunisia, the reduction has been even more drastic, going in the same period from 6.9 children per woman to 2.1. Algeria, 
for its part, has gone from 7.4 to 2.5.
9. David E. Bloom, David Canning and Jaypee Sevilla, The Demographic Dividend: A New Perspective on the Economic 
Consequences of Population Change, RAND MR-1274-WFHF/DLPF7RFIUNPF, 2002.
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demographic situation of  finding popula-
tions where the number of  dependent people 
(minors and the elderly) falls, while that of  
the active population reaches maximums. 
This process is parallel to the extraordinary 
improvement in the levels of  education 
among the most recent generations, both 
masculine and feminine. However, exploit-
ing this potential depends on the capacity 
of  the labour market to absorb the entry of  
young people, as well as the urgent chal-
lenges of  improving the production system 
and fighting unemployment.10
Some scholars, in relation to what 
happens between the two shores of  the 
Mediterranean, have sought to see in the 
relative scarcity of  youths on one shore and 
the relative excess on the other the main 
reason for the migratory movements from 
south to north. As if  they were dealing 
with the theory of  communicating vessels, 
they have made clear a supposed principle 
of  osmosis of  the population, considering 
both the fertility levels and the structures, 
which the demographer Joaquín Arango has 
satirically christened as “hydraulic popula-
tion theories”.11 In this way, migrations 
would be a way of  making the low fertility 
of  the developed countries less severe, or of  
compensating the structural deficits. This 
vision outside of  demography, and which 
does no more than replicate the arguments 
of  neoclassical economics extrapolating the 
differences in population structure to salary 
differences as the cause of  migrations, only 
seeks to displace to the demographic the 
existing clamorous economic imbalance, 
the true cause of  the majority of  migratory 
movements. Unfortunately, that simplistic 
explanation has been popularised under the 
name “replacement migrations”, following 
the report of  the Population Division of  the 
United Nations published in 2001,12 which 
seeks to appear rigorous by shielding itself  
behind the population forecasts and a spuri-
ous causality. It should be said that the re-
sponse of  demography, which has been blunt 
although not without a sense of  humour, 
questions the principle of  osmosis in demo-
graphic matters to the point of  reducing it to 
the absurd. The British demographer David 
Coleman shows that in order to make good 
the structural deficit in the relationship of  
dependency of  South Korea, the world popu-
lation would not be enough.13 To belie such 
a hypothesis others have pointed out how at 
this time international migrations take place 
with great intensity between countries with 
similar levels in terms of  fertility and the 
age structure of  their populations. The great 
African regional movements of  the Gulf  of  
Guinea or of  Austral Africa, for example, 
have been taking place between countries 
with high fertility and young structures 
while, at the opposite extreme, the fertility 
rates of  Eastern European countries with mi-
gration towards European Union countries 
are also notable for values even lower than 
those of  receiving countries and for a nota-
bly aged pyramid.14 Specifically, the Span-
10. Regui Asaad and Farzaneh Roudi-Fahmi, Youth in the Middle East and North Africa: Demographic Opportunity or 
Challenge?, Population Reference Bureau, 2007.
11. Joaquín Arango, “La ‘cuestión migratoria’ en la Europa de fines del siglo XX”, in Jordi Nadal (coord.), El mundo que 
viene, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1994, pp. 63-94.
12. Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?, Population Division, Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, 2001.
13. David A. Coleman, “Replacement Migration, or Why Everyone Is Going To Have To Live in Korea: A Fable for Our 
Times from the United Nations”, The Royal Society, no. 357, 2001, pp. 583-598.
14. Myron Weiner and Michael S. Teitelbaum, Political Demography, Demographic Engineering, New York/Oxford, 
Berghahn Books, 2001.
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15. Andreu Domingo and Fernando Gil, “Immigration et évolution de la structure de la main-d’oeuvre au Sud de l’Union 
européenne”, Population, no. 4, 2007, pp. 825-846.
Darío Villalba, Here (Marlborough Gallery Barcelona).
ish case, far from being evidence, as a quick 
glance at the demographic indicators would 
apparently suggest, is unbeatable proof  that 
undermines this hypothesis. Although it is 
true that Spain has stood out, together with 
Italy, for the minimums recorded in fertil-
ity and the maximums in the lengthening 
of  life expectancy, which in their turn has 
had repercussions on the rate of  ageing, so 
has the migratory boom experienced in the 
first years of  the 21st century taken place 
when the baby boom generations were in 
the labour market.15 The comparison of  the 
flows received by Spain and Italy is very il-
luminating: Italy, which began the decrease 
in its fertility before and reached lower levels 
than Spain, has received less immigration 
but, most importantly, has coincided in the 
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time and ages of  these flows, thus showing 
the causal relation of  the flows with the 
economic rather than the demographic 
situation.16
Youths, Protagonists of Migrations
If  the reason for migrations is not found in the 
deficit of  young people, what is their role in 
migrations? First, we should point out that the 
weight of  the migratory movements between 
15 and 29 years of  age is very important, es-
pecially in the last five years, from 25 to 29, 
which together with the 20-24 age group, are 
usually the main protagonists of  the phenom-
enon (in Spain, for example, 1 out of  every 3 
immigrants who arrived between 1997 and 
2006 were aged between 20 and 29). Second, 
we should recall that the flows taking place in 
the Mediterranean, albeit the most important, 
are not limited to those who cross the sea from 
south to north. There are other extra-Mediter-
ranean centres of  attraction, such as the coun-
tries of  the Persian Gulf, but there are also 
other flows of  migrants from third countries 
who arrive in significant numbers both in the 
countries which are clear receivers of  immi-
gration on the Northern shore, and the coun-
tries which are at the same time sources and 
receivers of  immigration. An example of  the 
latter would be Morocco or Algeria in terms of  
Sub-Saharan flows, with a foreign population 
of  2% in 2005, or Egypt or Libya in terms of  
flows from other neighbouring countries, with 
2% and 11% respectively. Those who believe 
that 2% is a very low percentage should note 
that Spain, if  we leave out the microstates of  
Liechtenstein and Luxemburg, today heads 
the list of  EU countries in foreign population 
percentage with 10%, while in 1999 it only 
reached 1.9%.
However, to really understand the role 
of  the young in migrations, in contrast to 
the idea of  replacement based on the demo-
graphic structural deficit, we propose the idea 
of  complementarity between migrants and 
non-migrants. Specifically, the complementa-
rity between immigrant and local youths, and 
especially between immigrants and the native 
generations of  youths, which responds to the so-
cio-demographic changes in the very definition 
of  youth (but also of  gender roles). Together 
with an especially positive economic situation, 
socio-demographic complementarity would be 
the phenomenon that would effectively explain 
the unusual growth in migrations received in 
Northern Mediterranean countries in recent 
years, especially in the Spanish case, which 
has positioned itself  at the head of  the flows 
received in the whole of  Europe. The increased 
level of  education and with it the expectation 
of  entry in the labour market, together with the 
mass entry of  women, would be the key pieces 
in this phenomenon, effectively amplified by 
the growth of  the number of  elderly people. 
If  on the one hand the entry of  baby boost 
generations, and with it the relative scarcity 
of  youths in the labour market, can be consid-
ered an incentive for immigration, we should 
bear in mind, however, that this phenomenon 
will also represent a substantial decrease in 
consumption, which should lead in its turn to 
the creation of  work places. In any case, the 
economic cycle will continue to have the last 
word in the future demand for workers. This 
complementarity in fact represents an unequal 
access to a segmented labour market in which 
immigrants always enter behind natives with 
the same level of  education. It is therefore a 
16. Andreu Domingo and Fernando Gil, “Desigualdad y complementariedad en el mercado de trabajo: autóctonos e 
inmigrantes en Italia y España”, Revista Italiana di Economia, Demografia e Statistica, 2007, pp. 75-100.
26  Youths and Mediterranean Youth: From Aesthetics to Demography Quaderns de la Mediterrània 27
type of  migration oriented towards the de-
mand for jobs requiring few qualifications, 
in contrast to the programmatic declarations 
of  the European Union, but also in contrast 
to the declaration of  some source countries, 
which make the “brain drain” an element of  
political negotiation. To put it another way, 
the less-qualified young have more to gain on 
this type of  circuit than the educated youths 
of  source countries, who will find themselves 
caught in a bottleneck of  the over-qualified. 
Moreover, most young immigrants from 25 to 
29 should be considered as adults if  we define 
them from the perspective of  their autonomy, 
given that they are emancipated in terms of  
home, family and economically.
Voices continue to warn about the possible 
conflict generated by cultural differences 
between autochthons and alloctones
Lastly, whatever the reason for migra-
tion, there is no lack of  European voices that 
threaten us with the ethnic substitution of  the 
population in the destination countries, and in 
keeping with Huntington’s discourse continue 
to warn about the possible conflict generated 
by cultural differences between autochthons 
and alloctones, or about the inevitable decline 
of  cultural and ethnic identity in the receiving 
countries.17 In this respect, we would like to 
point out that many of  the fears awoken by 
immigrants conceal the fear of  generational 
replacement. Within this current, the im-
migrant and the supposed cultural distance 
are confused with the youth and the gen-
erational distance. Applying an additional 
turn of  the screw to this issue, among some 
autochthonous citizens, on more than a few 
occasions, rather than a distance there is a 
real gap with the non-immigrant youths, 
with their own descendants. This is because 
they are closer to the values represented by 
some of  the young migrants – the values 
of  effort, self-realisation through work, the 
importance of  family ties or gender roles, for 
example – than to the values of  their chil-
dren and grandchildren. Those who profess 
such future fears should be warned, with 
exquisite tact, that the future has already 
arrived, and that the country they remember 
either never existed or only exists in their 
nostalgia.
Youths: Between Stigmatisation 
and Utopiasation
On both shores of  the Mediterranean this am-
bivalent perspective is sustained about youths 
and youth that, on the one hand, keeps the 
individual stigmatised, whether because of  
the potential turbulence attributed to them or 
accusations of  hedonism, while youthfulness is 
imposed as an aesthetic value. Literature has 
reflected this extraordinary paradox, precisely 
exploring the socio-demographic factors it 
involves, and trying to explain the transfor-
mations in the two segments of  life that have 
changed the most in recent decades: youth and 
old age.18 Together with the redefinition of  
ages, this same literature that attempts to 
explore and participate in the creation of  
the social imaginary clearly shows the con-
tradiction between individual behaviour and 
collective needs, which since its birth has 
been the Gordian knot that has occupied the 
centre of  demographic thought.19 Thus, we 
17. David Coleman, “Immigration and Ethnic Change in Low-Fertility Countries: A Third Demographic Transition”, 
Population and Development Review, vol. 32, no. 3, 2006, pp. 401-446.
18. Andreu Domingo, Descenso literario a los infiernos demográficos, Barcelona, Anagrama, 2008.
19. Paul Demeny, “Population and the Invisible Hand”, Demography, vol. 23, no. 4, 1986, pp. 473-487.
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find works that set out futures where eras-
ing the passage of  time is an obsession, and 
where youths must dissimulate their condi-
tion, such as Globalia by Jean-Christophe 
Rufin,20 where the young man is seen as 
the force of  social change par excellence. 
Or works such as that of  Michel Houelle-
becq, with his novel entitled The Possibility 
of  an Island21 in which, based on this same 
mystification of  youthfulness, the youth is 
regarded in clearly accusatory terms, in a 
world where the body and sexual attractive-
ness dominate as a source of  power, where 
intergenerational transferences benefit the 
young and where ageing, the discovery of  
obsolescence, is accompanied by an unspeak-
able process of  moral suffering.
The lengthening of  dependency which 
comes with the extension of  education in the 
information society seems to be a process with 
no return, even in the most favourable econom-
ic situations which induce some of  these youths 
to abandon their studies in favour of  the im-
mediate benefit that comes with entry into the 
labour market. The discourses that censure the 
young in one way or another, which barely hide 
their class roots, are discourses aimed against 
the worker, against the changes in gender roles, 
against political transformation, or which pres-
sure for an unconditional entry into the labour 
market by the youths who live in both Northern 
and Southern countries. Once again, what is 
happening in the Mediterranean region is no 
exception, but does attract attention because of  
the unusual intensity and rapidity with which 
these changes are taking place.
The reduction in the number of  youths in 
the countries of  the Northern shore, which we 
are now already seeing, will be replicated in the 
future in the countries of  the Southern shore. 
The demographic cycles in the next twenty 
years, however, are completely different: the 
relative scarcity of  youths in the north will 
correspond to the entry of  some baby boom 
generations in the south, but also to a different 
calendar, which will reach the maximum in 
2010 for the countries of  the Maghreb (Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia) and in 2035 for those of  
Makreb (Libya and Egypt). These baby boom 
generations will be followed by baby boost 
generations.22 With a negative economic situ-
ation, a reduced volume that puts pressure on 
the labour market can be beneficial, quite the 
contrary of  what happens with baby boom gen-
erations. The demographic potential continues, 
therefore, to depend on the economic context.
The scarcity of  youths will be generalised 
in all Mediterranean countries, stagnating 
at the 120 million between 2005 and 2040 
according to official prospects of  the United 
Nations, as a consequence of  the succession of  
increasingly more reduced generations because 
of  the decrease in fertility. Their significance 
will also decline owing to the growth in the 
number of  elderly, thanks to the improvements 
in mortality, which it is predicted could pass 
from 50 million in 2005 to 130 million in 2050. 
The scarcity of  youths should work in favour 
of  the individuals of  this age: the baby boost 
generations should benefit from their increased 
value, while seeing a reduction in competition 
among them. This, at least, is what has been 
seen historically.23 However, the institutional 
and political context of  each country will 
be definitive in the conditions of  life of  the 
young.
20. Paris, Gallimard, 2004.
21. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2005.
22. United Nations predictions: World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision Population Database, New York, United 
Nations, 2007.
23. Richard A. Easterlin, op. cit.
